Alien Registration- Thompson, Robert S. (Presque Isle, Aroostook County)

https://digitalmaine.com/alien_docs/33842/thumbnail.jp

Do Men and Women Perform Differently on Different Types of Test Questions?

Men, Women, Tests, Questions, Gender, Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession,

Hard Burst Emission from the Soft Gamma Repeater SGR 1900+14

We present evidence for burst emission from SGR 1900+14 with a power-law high energy spectrum extending beyond 500 keV. Unlike previous detections of high energy photons during bursts from SGRs, these emissions are not associated with high-luminosity burst intervals. Not only is the emission hard, but the spectra are better fit by Band's GRB function rather than by the traditional optically-thin thermal bremsstrahlung model. We find that the spectral evolution within these hard events obeys a hardness/intensity anti-correlation. Temporally, these events are distinct from typical SGR burst emissions in that they are longer (~ 1 s) and have relatively smooth profiles. Despite a difference in peak luminosity of > 1E+11 between these bursts from SGR 1900+14 and cosmological GRBs, there are striking temporal and spectral similarities between the two kinds of bursts, aside from spectral evolution. We outline an interpretation of these events in the context of the magnetar model.Comment: 11 pages (text and figures), submitted to ApJ Letters, corrected erroneous hardness ratio

The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions

Now, however, a new form of shareholder litigation has emerged that is distinct from derivative or securities fraud claims: class action lawsuits filed under state law challenging director conduct in mergers and acquisitions. The empirical data reported in this article show that these acquisition-oriented suits are now the dominant form of corporate litigation and outnumber derivative suits by a wide margin. Are these acquisition-oriented class actions just another deadbeat in the corporate governance debate? Should policymakers take action to cut back on the development of this new form of shareholder litigation? In this paper, we argue that, just as with derivative suits and securities fraud class actions, good policy must balance the positive managerial agency cost reducing effects of these acquisition-oriented shareholder suits against their litigation agency costs. To frame our analysis of acquisition-oriented class actions, we begin with a look back at the history of this debate over representative litigation in corporate and securities law. For six decades, there have been efforts to limit shareholder derivative suits. These suits, in which one shareholder sues in the name of and on behalf of the corporation, are. usually brought to enforce various fiduciary duties that officers and directors owe corporations and their shareholders. They thus can be contrasted to normal corporate litigation in which directors determine what actions to take for the corporation. Derivative suits were once said to have promise as a means to limit managerial agency costs

The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits

Derivative suits, long the principal vehicle for discussions about representative litigation in corporate and securities law, now share the stage with younger cousins - securities fraud class actions and state law fiduciary duty class actions. At the same time alternative governance vehicles - independent directors, auditors and other reforms that have followed in the wake of Enron - potentially diminish the relative place of litigation such as derivative suits. This article presents data from all derivative suits filed in Delaware over a two-year period. We find a relatively small number, certainly as compared to fiduciary class action and securities fraud class actions. Unlike these other representative suits, derivative suits are used for both public and close corporations. They arise usually in a duty of loyalty context. Contrary to earlier studies, we do not find evidence that these cases are strike suits yielding little benefit. Instead, roughly 30% of the derivative suits provide relief to the corporation or the shareholders, while the others are usually dismissed quickly with little apparent litigation activity. In cases producing a recovery to shareholders, those amounts typically exceed the amount of attorneys\u27 fees awarded by a significant margin. They do demonstrate some indicia of litigation agency costs (for example suits being filed quickly, multiple suits per controversy, and repeat plaintiffs\u27 law firms), but each of these is much less pronounced for derivative suits than for other forms of representative litigations. Overall, the claim that derivative suits are strike suits is much weaker than in earlier periods. The Delaware judiciary, which hears most public company corporate litigation in America, has effectively monitored these cases. There is room to open the door for larger shareholders to utilize these suits to police corporate misconduct. Institutional shareholders, while not willing to take on as large a role in governance as many have suggested in terms of naming directors and the like, may be willing to take a larger role in derivative litigation. Thus we see potential for derivative litigation to play a more important role in the future. We therefore suggest that suits brought by a one percent or larger shareholder should be excused from the demand requirement currently applied in derivative suits

The Future of Agency Independence

Independent agencies have long been viewed as different from executive-branch agencies because the President lacks authority to fire their leaders for political reasons, such as failure to follow administration policy. In this Article, we identify mechanisms that make independent agencies increasingly responsive to presidential preferences. We find these mechanisms in a context where independent agencies traditionally have dominated: financial policy. In legislative proposals for securing market stability, we point to statutorily mandated collaboration on policy between the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury. In administration practices for improving securities regulation, we focus on White House coordination of, and Treasury Department involvement in, the policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission. We argue that these mechanisms undermine the conventional distinction between independent agencies and executive-branch agencies. Additionally, we argue that these mechanisms, though producing presidential involvement short of plenary control, are consistent with the strategic political interests of the President. We further contend that they promote political accountability, particularly because greater presidential control is unnecessary to align agency preferences with presidential preferences; indeed, such control might be counterproductive. In making this argument, we present a nuanced vision of accountability and update the standard justifications for independence. We also consider the constitutional implications of the new independence-accountability hybrids that we see, as well as possible applications in areas where executive-branch agencies traditionally have dominated. Our claim is not that these hybrids are part of law in any of these contexts; rather, we seek to highlight institutional relationships that outstrip conventional categories but fit with the development of the administrative state. In the future, agency independence will occur not at odds with political accountability but engaged with it along a spectrum of institutional structures

Selective Tooth Clipping in the Management of Low-Birth-Weight Piglets

A study was designed to test the potential benefits of selective tooth clipping (the practice of leaving the eye teeth intact in the smallest piglets of a litter to make them more competitive) under commercial conditions. A total of 346 litters were assigned to either the control treatment where all piglets had their teeth clipped, or the experimental treatment where one or more piglets of low birth weight had their teeth left intact. Piglets were weighed within 24 h of birth and at 7, 21 and 56 d. In litters of 12-14 animals, but not in smaller litters, the lower-birth-weight piglets had lower mortality in experimental than in control litters (32.0 vs. 39.8%), whereas higher-birth-weight piglets showed a trend in the opposite direction, with 14.4% mortality in experimental vs. 13.2% in control litters (P = 0.05. The weight gain of lower-birth-weight piglets was greater (166 vs. 143 g d‒1) in experimental than in control litters of 9-11 piglets, but the heavier piglets competing against the small litter-mates with intact teeth had lower weight gains than the controls (177 vs. 187 g d‒1) (P \u3c 0.02). Within-litter variance of 21-d weights was about 15% smaller (P \u3c 0.005) in experimental than in control litters. Thus, selective tooth-clipping does not improve overall growth and survival, but it contributes to more uniform weaning weights and may help the most vulnerable piglets to remain alive until fostering or other intervention can be accomplished